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Abstract: 
The paper examines the role of banking relationships on firm performance for a sample 
of Indian manufacturing firms. The two variables used to portray banking relationships 
are: the extent of bank borrowing and the number of banking relationships maintained by 
a firm. Analysis suggests that while the extent of bank borrowing has a negative impact 
on firm performance, the multiple banking relationships maintained by a firm positively 
enhances firm performance. In addition, firm performance plays an important role in 
influencing bank borrowing and the number banking relationships a firm maintains. 
While banking relationships are positively impacted by firm performance, results suggest 
nonlinearity between bank financing and firm performance, suggesting the possibility of 
a potential debt overhang concern. This implies that firms with low growth opportunities 
tend to borrow more from banks due to lack of other opportunities to finance their 
investments. However, firms beyond a certain threshold of profitability tend to employ 
lesser debt to finance their investments in order to prevent the wealth transfer from 
shareholders to creditors. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Until recent times, developing countries were largely characterized by institutional 
factors and government interventions which often constrained lending decisions. The 
reforms in the financial sector in many developing countries including India have enabled 
a move towards market driven allocation of resources, which, along with the deepening 
of financial markets, has provided greater flexibility and wider choices to firms in 
determination of their financial structure (Bhaduri 2000, Ghosh 2007). However, despite 
these changes, bank financing still remains important source of funding in many 
emerging countries. In India, bank credit has not only remained the most important 
source of funding but it has rather gained prominence over the years (Figure 1). 
 
While there is a vast literature and empirical evidences that seek to understand the impact 
of banking relationships on firm performance in developed countries, yet few studies 
have attempted to examine the effect of bank relationship on firm performance in 
emerging markets. The relative paucity of studies on emerging markets is due to two 
main reasons: First, while most of the extant studies on developed markets conclude that 
direct bank borrowing gives better access to capital and more efficient monitoring on 
firms (Diamond, 1991), the role played by the bank in emerging markets is much more 
complex. Despite many disadvantages (eg. underinvestment and asset substitution), 
highlighted by the extant literature, in the absence of alternative means of monitoring of 
firms in many of these markets, bank credit has gained relevance to provide the much 
needed supervision to protect the interest of the stakeholders. Second, on the other hand, 
in many emerging markets, including India, since banks play simultaneously the role of 
lender as well as shareholders therefore, banks may face apparent conflict of interest and 
in such occasion may favor their interest at the expense of general shareholders (Bris et 
al.,2006;Gorton and Schmid,2000; Petersen and Rajan,1994;Santos and 
Rumble,2006).Further, this problem is accentuated by the weak corporate governance at 
banks and companies in the emerging markets(Cull andXu,2000; Tian,2004) 
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Therefore, new evidence on the relationship between bank borrowing and firm 
performance is warranted for emerging markets such as India because of institutional 
backgrounds (Claessens et al 1998) which contrast drastically with those of the 
developed markets. The paper tries to bridge the gap by studying the merits and demerits 
of bank borrowing and the influence of bank borrowing on firm performance in India, a 
leading emerging economy. In addition, this paper tries to explore the interlinkage 
between the number of banking relationships a firm maintains and the firm performance. 
  The paper contributes to the literature in two primary ways: First, it intends to fill the 
gap by providing new evidence regarding the role of banking relationships on firm 
performance by investigating the interactions between firm performance and bank 
financing from the perspective of emerging markets such as India. It also explores issues 
of underinvestment in relation with bank financing and growth opportunities of the firm. 
Second, this study makes contribution by exploring the role of number of banking 
relationships a firm maintains on the performance of a firm, an aspect which has not been 
dealt with in the Indian context. 
The main findings of the paper suggest that while the extent of bank borrowing has a 
negative impact on firm performance, the multiple banking relationships maintained by a 
firm positively enhances firm performance. In addition, firm performance plays an 
important role in influencing bank borrowing and the number banking relationships a 
firm maintains. While banking relationships are positively impacted by firm performance, 
results suggest nonlinearity between bank financing and firm performance, suggesting the 
possibility of a potential debt overhang concern. This implies that firms with low growth 
opportunities tend to borrow more from banks due to lack of other opportunities to 
finance their investments. However, firms beyond a certain threshold of profitability tend 
to employ lesser debt to finance their investments in order to prevent the wealth transfer 
from shareholders to creditors. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section two describes the literature 
survey. Section three describes the data base used for the analysis. Section four provides 
the empirical specification, variables and hypothesis tested in the paper. Section five 
interprets the results, and section six concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Survey 
The literature on corporate finance widely recognises the role of banks in determining the   
availability and cost of credit. Banks as financial intermediaries, try to reduce capital 
market frictions that arise due to informational asymmetries, by channelling funds from 
investors to profitable business opportunities. There are several facets associated with 
these relationships that develop between firms and banks: First, banks monitor in order to 
ensure that the managers of their client firms take efficient business action, (Diamond 
1984). Bank monitoring can also reduce the deleterious impact of the managerial agency 
costs by compelling mangers to be productive and ensure that they align their incentives 
with those of the shareholders. Banks influence the investment decisions of their client 
firms through forceful tools of intervention like threat not to renew credit (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1983). This reduction of the agency problems (that often takes the form of asset 
substitution and underinvestment) can potentially improve firm value. Second, banks 
screen the loan applications of prospective clients in order to assess the credit worthiness 
of the firms (Diamond, 1991). Thus, an approval of bank loan also facilitates reputation-
building for firms. This certification of creditworthiness further helps in raising funds 
from public markets in the future (Diamond, 1991). Third, public debt financing involves 
incurring of information costs (Fama, 1985). These costs can be avoided by bank loan 
financing as firms would not have to disclose information to public and thereby also 
reduce the risk of private information being revealed to rival firms (Yosha, 1995). The 
reduction in such disclosure costs is likely to enhance firm performance. Finally, as 
suggested by Sharpe (1990), bank reputation leads to reduction in inefficient allocation of 
resources. Efficient mobilization and allocation of funds, lowers the cost of capital to 
firms, boosts capital formation, as well as stimulates productivity and growth (Ross, 
2004). 
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The   literature however suggests that while bank monitoring improves corporate 
governance of the firm and ensures more efficient business actions, this better 
governance often comes at the cost of an informational advantage that banks have over 
other providers of capital. Banks can pursue rent seeking activities by exploiting the 
private information it acquires from the firm. This informational monopoly over firms 
strengthens the bargaining position of the banks. The bank can use this control to cut-off 
a firm’s loan or even charge a high interest rate. In extreme case, the bank can also 
influence the choice of projects, levy compensating balances, or refuse to relax covenants 
when the credit rating improves. This accentuates the asset substitution and under 
investment problem (Rajan, 1992) thereby reducing the value of the firm. Further, it is 
not easy for firms to terminate their relationship with opportunistic banks as firms have to 
incur an extra search cost in order to look for other banks or other sources of financing. 
Firms can also face a loss of reputation amongst other banks if they discontinue banking 
relationship which could create a potential impediment of access to finance (Castelli, et 
al, 2006). Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) have conjectured that bank-firm 
relationship weakens due to increased monitoring costs and other costs associated with 
bank financing. The reserve requirements and less liquidity of bank debt in comparison to 
publicly traded debt translate into increased required rate of return on firms’ investments. 
Further, some of the empirical evidences also corroborates that this conflict of interest 
between banks, managers and firm owners distort investment policies as well as lowers 
profits. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), in their study of Japanese firms find that though 
banks facilitate greater access to credit, little benefits accrue to firms due to the conduct 
of rent seeking behaviour by banks who also pressurize clients to pursue less profitable 
and less risky investments in order to insulate themselves from risks. Broadly consistent 
with this, are results found by Agarwal and Elston (2000) who investigate the impact of 
bank influence on financing decisions and firm performance in Germany and find that 
bank influence leads to increased access to capital but does not improve firm 
performance or growth. 
However, according to Von Thadden (1992) and Rajan (1992), firms can engage in 
multiple banking relationships in order to mitigate the rent seeking behaviour arising 
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from the informational monopoly due to single bank engagement thereby reducing the 
hold-up cost. This leads to a strand of literature that brings out the merits and demerits 
associated with multiple banking relationships. Much of the literature on bank financing 
is based on the premise that firms borrow from single banks (Sharpe 1990, Diamond 
1991 a, Rajan 1992). Single banking relationships, as often argued in the literature, help 
in reducing transaction costs that arise because of the duplication in screening and 
monitoring costs (Diamond, 1984). Secondly, it reduces information costs as it prevents 
the publicizing of private information which in turn reduces the possibility that 
confidential information can be revealed when a firm deals with a single bank (Von 
Rheinbaben and Ruckes, 1998). Thirdly, the free rider problem is less in the case of a 
single banking relationship, as a single creditor has a stronger incentive to monitor its 
borrowers and thus can exert a positive impact on the firm's performance (Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1996). 
On the other hand, multiple banking relationships may enhance the performance of the 
firms due to several reasons. Firstly, the information monopoly or the hold-up problem 
can be eliminated by maintaining multiple banking relationships which reduces the 
interest rate charged by the inside banks (Rajan, 1992). Secondly, maintaining single 
banking relationships can expose a firm to problems such as future unavailability of 
credit required to be reinvested. This problem might be faced by firms if the bank 
concerned is affected by liquidity shocks. Further, firms can also be faced with adverse 
selection problems. This makes sourcing funds outside of the relationship 
difficult. Therefore, firms may want to diversify such risks by maintaining multiple 
banking relationships. (Detragiache et al., 2000). Thirdly, maintaining multiple banking 
relationships can reduce strategic default (which occurs when managers of firms try to 
divert the cash to themselves) as the borrowing firms will have to negotiate with multiple 
creditors which would reduce the firms’ incentives to strategic default (Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1996).   
Some empirical studies find evidences in favour of negative relationship between number 
of bankers and firm profitability. Degryse and Ongena, (2001) have found a negative 
relationship between the number of bankers and firm profitability for a set of Norwegian 
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firms for a period of 1975-1995.  Broadly consistent with these results is evidence found 
by Fok, et. al,  (2004) where a negative relationship is found between number of domestic 
bankers and firm performance for Taiwanese firms during the Asian financial crises 
1997. 
Therefore, a complete understanding of the nature and dynamics of the relationship 
between bank borrowing and firm performance is one of the most challenging issues in 
the literature of corporate finance. However, due to existence of various competing 
hypotheses the issue still remains unresolved. Hence, it is important to develop empirical 
models to validate the theories with contrasting institutional backgrounds. 
 
 
3.  Data and Sample  
The study uses an unbalanced panel data for the period 2002 to 2009 drawn from the 
Capital line database. Capital line database provides a comprehensive record of 
accounting and financial information of a large number of Indian firms. Since the focus 
of this study is on manufacturing establishments, attention here is restricted to a smaller 
subset of firms listed in this database. Based on the availability of data, the final sample 
contains financial information for 957 companies (with 4307 year observations) which 
are listed on the stock exchanges. The sample set, being a composite and heterogeneous 
mix of firms, offers considerable scope for cross sectional variation in data. In addition to 
the fact that the firms under consideration come from a broad spectrum of industries, this 
heterogeneity of the sample makes itself apparent in the spread of distribution of the 
firms over age and size, as suggested in Table 1. The details of number of banking 
relationships of the firm for the sample are collected from the Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE)’s electronic database called ‘‘PROWESS’’. This data set,3 
which has not been exploited before in best of our knowledge, enables us to investigate 
whether or not there exists a significant difference in firm performance between firms 
that maintain single banking and those who maintain multiple banking relationships. 
There are three important observations that emerge from our preliminary analysis: As 
                                                 
3 Merging both prowess and capital line database 
 8
depicted in the Figure 1, the sample data, over the years depicts a rising trend in the use 
of bank debt. This rising trend also conforms to the trend in bank borrowing as a 
percentage of external funds for a relatively larger data set of non financial firms 
published by CMIE report on the corporate sector.  This growing eminence of bank debt 
as a source of financing in India necessitates an analysis which seeks to find out if bank 
financing bears an impact on firm performance. Second, the share of firms that maintain 
single, multiple and varying banking relationships in Table 2 indicate that 25% of the 
Indian firms maintain single banking relationships, while 64% of the firms maintain 
multiple banking relationships and 10% of the firms switch between single and multiple 
banking relationships during the sample period. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 
suggests that the median number of banking relationships for the 957 firms across time is 
2 and 75th percentile for the same is 4. In contrast, when compared with developed 
countries such as US, 44.5%4 of the US firms rely on single banking relationships while 
the median number of banking relationships is two. These statistics seem to indicate that 
Indian firms tend to rely more on multiple banking relationships whereas firms in the US 
rely more on single banking relationships. This paper seeks to find out the prospective 
reasons for why more firms in India rely on multiple banking relationships and provides 
explanation for cross sectional variation in the number of banking relationships.  
 
Figure 1 Recent Trend in Bank Borrowing in India 
                                                 
4  The statistics on US has been taken from the paper titled Multiple Vs Single banking 
relationship: Theory and Evidence  authored by Enrica Detragiache, Paolo Garella, Luigi Guiso, 
June 2000. 
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Finally, we focus on the data on number of bankers to a firm which enables us to 
investigate whether there is a significant difference in firm performance between firms 
that maintain single banking and firms that maintain multiple banking relationships. In 
order to get an initial insight into the data we have looked at the trends in performance, 
measured by Tobin’sQ by segregating the data set into two: Firms which maintain only 
single banking relationships and firms which maintain only multiple banking 
relationships during the sample period. The results of the t-test indicate that there exists a 
significant difference between the average values of the Tobin’s Q of the two samples. 
On an average, Tobin’s Q (1.44) of firms that maintain only multiple banking 
relationships is significantly more than the Tobin’s Q (1.01) of firms that maintain only 
single banking relationship. This significant difference in average Tobin’s Q of firms that 
maintain only single and only multiple banking relationships is also persistent over years. 
As can be seen in figure two, the mean Tobin’s Q of the firms that maintain only multiple 
banking relationships is consistently higher than the mean Tobin’s Q of the firms that 
maintain single banking relationships across years. This further motivates an analysis that 
looks at the factors that affect firm value in a multivariate framework. 
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Figure 2: Mean performance of firm that maintain only single and only multiple 
banking relationships 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics of the Sample                                                                                                 
Variables  Median 75th  Percentile of Bank Relations 
Number of Bank Relations 2 4 
Size 84.615 237.96 
Age  23 39.99 
Tobin's Q 0.77 1.04 
Sub-Sample Statistics:  Multiple Vs Single Banking Firms  
Variables Multiple Bank  Single Bank 
Tobin's Q 1.44 (0.96) 1.01* (0.72) 
Age 31.73 (29.99) 22.66 (21) 
Size 242.42(235.31) 39.04 (33.82) 
 
Note: Size Age and Tobin’s Q are reported at the beginning of the sample. “*” indicate a significant 
difference in mean at 1% level of significance. The sub-sample statistics report mean and median values 
(given in the parenthesis) of Size and Age of the respective groups. However, the Tobin’s Q values for the 
sub-sample are reported across years.  
                                                 
5 The figures are in Crores.  
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 Table 2: Share of firms with single, multiple and varying banking relationships 
Number of Bank Relations for a sample of  869 
Manufacturing Firms in India Share 
Share of firms with Single Banking Relationship 221 (25.43%) 
Share of firms with Multiple Banking Relationship 558 (64.21%) 
Share of firms with varying Banking Relationships 90 (10.36%) 
Note: Table reports the share of firms that maintain only single, only multiple and firms that switch 
between maintain single and multiple banking relationships across years. The total number of firms 
considered for this analysis is 869. The values within the parenthesis refer the percentage share of firms 
maintaining single, multiple and varying banking relationships. 
 
4. Empirical Model Specification and Variables 
As has been argued earlier, the purpose of this analysis is to test the net impact of 
banking relationships on firm performance. In order to formulate an empirical 
framework, we allow the banking relationship and firm performance to be jointly 
determined, using a simultaneous equation model. Specifically, the paper uses the 
following simultaneous equation models: 
Performance Equation 1: 
 
 
We have used two distinct specifications to capture the bank relationship with firm 
performance: 
Bank Relationship Equation 1: 
 
  
 
Bank Relationship Equation 2: 
 
 
Performance of the firm is measured by the Tobin’s Q (TQ) which is measured as the 
ratio of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity to total assets. While, the 
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intensity of borrower-lender relationship is portrayed by using two measures: (a) The 
magnitude of bank debt which is measured as total bank borrowing scaled by the total 
assets of the firm (TBD/TA); (b) Number of bankers to a firm captured by the natural 
logarithm of number of banking relationships to a firm (LNUM). This leads to two 
alternative bank relationship equations. All the models are estimated using a three stage 
least square methods (3SLS). Since the nature of our data involves an unbalanced panel, 
in order to incorporate for the unobserved effects, ideally models should be estimated 
either with the fixed effect or the random effect. However, given the complexity involved 
in conducting a 3SLS panel using fixed effects, a two step approach is adopted for this 
analysis: First, the data is manually demeaned to purge the unobserved heterogeneity 
followed by running a 3SLS on the transformed variables.  
 
4.1 Empirical Model 1 
The first model jointly determines Performance Equation 1 and Bank Relationship 
Equation 1. The overall impact of bank financing on firm performance depends upon the 
benefits and costs associated with bank financing. If bank debt acts as a monitoring agent 
then it is likely to enhance efficiency and performance of the firm. Alternatively, if rent 
seeking activities are pursued by banks, it can adversely affect firm performance. 
Therefore, the impact of bank financing on firm performance is ambiguous. 
The control variables used in the performance equation are: CE (capital expenditure 
defined as change in net fixed assets as scaled by total assets), LNNUM (Number of 
banking relationship defined as natural logarithm of number of banking relationship), 
Size (defined as natural logarithm of total assets), Age (as natural logarithm of Age), and 
TA (Tangible Assets as scaled by total assets).  
Sales growth is expected to be a positive determinant of the Tobin’s Q, because higher 
market power and efficiency should result in improved firm performance. Further, older 
firms may face lower communication costs and therefore have better access to capital 
which could lead to better performance. Therefore, performance of the firm is likely to 
improve as it matures. At the same time, older firms maybe in the later stages of their life 
cycles. This may restrict investment opportunities of such firms since these firms could 
be characterised by rigid administration and bureaucracy. Hence a negative relationship 
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may also be expected between age and firm performance. Therefore, the net impact of 
age on firm performance could be ambiguous. Large firms may enjoy greater market 
power and they may face lesser informational asymmetries and thereby have better access 
to capital, which could translate into better firm performance. At the same time, large 
firms may be characterized by problems such as diseconomies of scale and agency 
problems, which could negatively impact firm performance. Hence, the net impact of size 
on firm performance could also be ambiguous. As argued by Houston and James (1996), 
capital expenditures influence future growth opportunities of the firm and hence, it is 
expected that capital expenditure could be a positive determinant of Tobin’s Q. Finally, 
the over-all impact of the number of banking relationships on firm performance is 
complex and depends on the dynamics between costs and benefits of the nature of the 
banking relationships. While, on the hand, multiple banking relationships may dilute the 
role of bank monitoring causing severe informational problems and thereby increasing 
the cost of coordinating with lending banks which could negatively impact firm 
performance, on the other hand, it could also mitigate the problem of premature 
liquidation and hold up costs which is conducive to better firm performance. Therefore, 
the net impact of number of banking relationship of a firm on firm performance is an 
intriguing issue. 
 
In the paper, we have used two distinct specifications to capture the bank relationship 
with the firm performance. The first bank relationship equation is specified as follows: 
 
 
Several control variables are introduced in the specification. Since bank borrowing entails 
monitoring over the firm by the bank, which reduces the opportunistic behavior of the 
managers, the growing firms (defined by Tobin’s Q) with significant potential investment 
opportunities tend to increase their borrowing from the bank. However, firms during their 
early stages of growth have low level of credibility and credit worthiness and hence find 
difficulty in getting access to other financing options and tend to depend on bank for 
financing.  
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On the contrary, firms experiencing higher level of growth could avoid bank borrowing 
as they could be subjected to more severe agency problems which might involve a 
disproportionate transfer of wealth from shareholders to creditors arising from profitable 
investment opportunities. This might lead to a more complex and non-linear relationship 
between bank borrowing and growth of a firm. 
The other control variables used in the model are: CF (cash flow defined as net income 
and depreciation scaled by total assets), TA (tangible assets), SIZE, AGE, and Sales 
Growth. Cash flow is used a proxy for liquidity of the firm. The Pecking Order theory 
argues that a firm characterized by high internal cash flow would rely less on outside 
sources for financing for its capital requirements and hence the cash flows variable is 
likely to be negatively related to bank financing. Since more profitable, matured and 
growing firms (captured through Sales growth) have capacity to borrow more and also 
the firms with higher sales growth are likely to face low default risk, therefore, a positive 
association is expected between sales growth and bank borrowing.  
Similarly, since tangible assets owned by firms serve as collateral for most of the secured 
bank borrowings, the proportion of tangible assets is expected to have a positive impact 
on the firms’ capacity of bank borrowing.  
 
The existing literature considers size as an important determinant of capital structure 
choice. Firms that are larger in size tend to be more diversified and are in a better position 
to take more debt as opposed to smaller firms. They are also less likely to be subjected to 
failures and therefore, tend to assume more bank borrowing.Therefore; a positive 
relationship is expected between size and bank financing. Similarly, older firms are likely 
to have a greater reputation and face lesser informational asymmetry in the market which 
enables them to have easier access to bank debt finances. Hence, a positive association is 
expected between age and bank financing. 
 
4.2 Empirical Model 2  
The second model jointly determines the number of banking relationships a firm 
maintains (LNNUM) and firm performance (TQ). 
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The performance equation is specified as follows:  
 
 
As argued earlier in the paper, the multiple banking relationships might reduce efficacy 
of bank monitoring, causing more severe informational problem and increasing the cost 
of coordinating with lending banks, therefore a negative relationship is expected between 
firm performance and bank relationship. On the contrary, a positive association would 
imply that the multiple banking relationships help to mitigate the problem of premature 
liquidation and hold up costs.  
As described earlier the other control variables used in the specification are: CE (Capital 
Expenditure), Size, Age, Leverage and Sales Growth. It is often argued that the debt can 
reduce the opportunistic incentives of the manager and prevent sub-optimal investments. 
These reductions in non-value maximising activities can potentially enhance firm 
performance (Jensen, 1986). However, firms facing high financial risk or less reputation 
may find it hard to funds required for pursuing profitable investments which can reduce 
firm performance. Hence, the impact of leverage on firm performance is likely to be 
positive. The other control variables have the same interpretation as used in the 
performance equation of model one. 
 
The alternative banking relationship equation is specified as follows: 
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Firms that are more profitable find lesser informational problems and also find it is easier 
to establish relationship with many banks. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected 
between number of banking relationships and firm profitability. The control variables are 
Coverage (defined as earning to interest payment ratio), Leverage (defined as total debt to 
asset ratio), Size and Age.   
 
According to Diamond (1991), old firms are likely to be more reputable and face less 
adverse selection problems in seeking finance from non-relationship banks and therefore, 
will face lesser need to raise finances by maintaining multiple banking relationships. On 
the other hand, establishing relationships with multiple banks may take time and 
therefore, a positive relationship is expected between age and number of banking 
relationships. Further, according to Houston and James (1996), firms with longer 
operating histories may tend to maintain multiple banking relationships. Therefore, the 
relation between age and number of banking relationships could be ambiguous.  
 
            Large firms are more likely to borrow from high-quality banks, and have 
relationships with more banks in order to diversify credit risk and hence size is expected 
to be a positive determinant of number of banking relationships. Johnson (1997) 
conjecture that firms which is highly leveraged are prone to greater credit risks and 
therefore, the monitoring role of the banks becomes important. Hence, highly leveraged 
firms may borrow from multiple prominent banks, although high quality banks may be 
reluctant to lend to firms with high credit risks. Detragiache et al (2000) however, on the 
contrary, find a significant and negative relation between leverage and the number of 
bank relationships. This may be because firms that are highly leveraged may be more 
prone to greater financial risks and thus, may find it difficult to explore new bank 
relationships. Therefore, the literature suggests that impact of leverage on number of 
banking relationships can be ambiguous.  
 
 The coverage ratio reflects firms’ repayment ability. According to Foglia, 
Laviola and Reedtz (1998), when a borrower, borrows from multiple lenders, interest 
rates decline in favour of the borrower and therefore, as the coverage ration increases, the 
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financial structure of the firm improves.   Hence, higher the coverage ratio, the firm will 
be able to borrow from greater number of banks. Firms with high liquidity positions face 
lesser probability of financial distress. More liquid firms may depend upon fewer banking 
relationships and fewer bank loans. Hence greater liquidity as measured by coverage is 
expected to be associated with lesser number of banking relationship to a firm. Therefore, 
the impact of coverage on number of banking relationships is ambiguous.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
The paper examines the impact of banking relationships on firm performance using an 
empirical framework that allows the banking relationship and firm performance to be 
jointly determined, using a simultaneous equation model. The empirical models are 
estimated using a 3SLS estimation technique after a one-way demeaning of the variables 
used in the models6. 
 
Model 1: Empirical Results 
Table 3 sets out the results of the nonlinear 3SLS estimates for the simultaneous equation 
model defined by Eqs. (1) – (2). One can see that both methods (Column Two and Three 
of table 3) give quite consistent results with regard to the signs and significance of 
coefficients of variables except Tobin’s Q and Age in the bank financing equation. 
Further it can be seen from Table 4, both bank debt to assets ratio and Tobin’s Q is 
statistically significant in equations (1) and (2) respectively. This suggests a possibility of 
simultaneous effect in the models and hence, the interpretation using 3SLS method is 
more accurate than that using OLS method. Therefore, in the following section, we only 
focus on the 3SLS results.  
 
The estimates suggest a significant two-way causal relationship between firm profitability 
and bank debt. The negative estimate on bank financing in the performance equation 
implies that that firms with greater bank debt financing are less profitable. This suggests 
that the demerits associated with bank financing such as rent seeking activities (that 
                                                 
6  Note that the set of simultaneous equations in the two models are exactly identified 
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arising out of informational monopoly that banks have over other providers of capital) 
have a negative impact on firm performance. 
 
Turing to the bank financing equation, the positive coefficient on the Tobin’s Q  and 
negative coefficient on Tobin’s Q square respectively suggests a non-linear relationship 
between bank financing and firm performance. A positive association between the 
Tobin’s Q and bank financing implies that firms with low growth opportunities tend to 
depend more on bank debt due to lack of other alternatives. However, beyond certain 
threshold values of Tobin’s Q the relationship turns to a more conventional inverse 
association. One plausible explanation for the observed inverse “U” shaped relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and bank debt could be attributed to a variant of potential debt 
overhang problem7, wherein low growth firms take on more bank borrowing due to lack 
of other financing options and firms that operate at or beyond the threshold level of 
performance, reduce the amount of bank financing in order to prevent the transfer of 
funds from shareholders to creditors.  
 
In terms of the exogenous variables age carries a positive significant coefficient in the 
performance equation, suggesting that firms that are likely to survive for longer are more 
profitable. The coefficient on age is a positive determinant of bank financing, implying 
that firms that are older face lesser asymmetry of information problem and thus are likely 
to be more leveraged. Similarly, tangible assets are a positive determinant of bank 
borrowing. Higher tangible assets are a source of collateral to the firm which enables the 
firm to take on more debt.  The coefficient of cash flow is negative, which is consistent 
with the argument of the pecking order theory. This suggests that a firm characterized by 
high internal cash flow would rely less on outside sources for financing for its capital 
requirements. Sales Growth is positively related to bank borrowing. The result suggests 
that firms that are more growing and profitable tend to be more leveraged. Also 
consistent with the sales accelerator model, sales growth has a positive significant 
                                                 
7   Debt over hang describes  a  situation  in which  the  existing debt discourages  firm  to undertake new 
investment  because  any  benefits  from  the  new  investment  will  go  to  the  creditors  rather  than  the 
owners. 
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coefficient in the performance equation.  Similarly, as expected the capital expenditure 
also has a significant, positive coefficient on firm performance. 
 
Size is a positive determinant of the firm performance which implies that larger firms 
tend to be more diversified and help reducing bankruptcy costs.  However, its impact on 
firm performance is statistically insignificant. Large firms exhibit a significantly positive 
impact on bank financing as firms that are large are more diversified and are less subject 
to financial distress and therefore, tend to accumulate more bank debt.  
 
In contrast to our earlier findings which suggest that bank borrowing has a negative 
impact on firm performance, the positive coefficient for the number of bankers suggests 
that borrowing from multiple banks however, result in improved firm performance. As 
we will see later, this is consistent with the results of our second set of models which 
captures the relationship between number of banking relationships and firm performance. 
These findings are consistent with Rajan’s (1992) argument that borrowing from multiple 
sources reduces the bank’s ability to pursue rent seeking activities, without compromising 
on its ability to control and monitor firm performance.  
 
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we have estimated several other alternative 
specifications. Column 3 of table 3, presents one such specification, where natural 
logarithm of number of bankers to a firms is replaced by an interactive variable, which is 
defined as a product of natural logarithm of number of bankers to a firms and bank 
borrowing. The positive statistically significant coefficient on the interactive variable 
further corroborates our claim that borrowing from multiple banks mitigates the adverse 
impact of bank borrowing on firm performance.  
 
Table 4 presents the 3SLS results (of our model 2) which examines the relationship 
between firm performance and the number of banking relationships that a firm enjoys. 
The results suggest a significantly positive two-way causal relationship between firm 
profitability and number of banking relationship, indicating that firms with multiple 
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banking relationships are more profitable and those profitable firms maintain multiple 
banking relationships.  
 
In the performance equation, the positive sign on the natural logarithm of the number of 
bankers to a firm coefficient implies that multiple banking relationship positively impacts 
firm value. This suggests that hold up costs that are usually attributed to maintaining 
single banking relationships, are mitigated by maintaining multiple banking relationships 
and therefore, firms do not experience erosion of profitability due to costs arising from 
single banking relationships. This may also be consistent with Von Rheinbaben and 
Ruckes (1998) suggesting that firms maintain multiple banking relationships will have 
lower cost of credit and face less stringent loan terms and hence, facilitate firm 
performance.  
 
This result contrasts with those reported for several developed markets, where a negative 
relationship is found between the number of banking relationships and performance 
(Ongena and Smith, 2000, Fok Cheng Lee, 2004)  
 
Developing economies are often characterized by weak banking competition, creditor 
rights and poor disclosure/accounting standards, leading to significant market power 
shared amongst fewer banks, worsening soft budget constraint problems and high cost of 
monitoring.  In such circumstances, firms in poor conditions may be unable to incur the 
cost of losing access to bank financing. These motives therefore create strong incentives 
for firms to maintain multiple banking relationships (Berger et. Al, 2005) 
  
In the bank relationship equation, a positive sign on the Tobin’s Q variable reiterates the 
expectation more profitable firms face lesser adverse selection problems and find it is 
easier to establish relationships with multiple banks. 
 
Turning to the exogenous variables, we find that number of banking relationships is 
positively related to firm age. This is consistent with (Houston and James, 1996) who 
state that firms with longer operational histories tend to maintain relationships with 
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multiple banks. However, the coefficient of age on the firm performance equation is 
negatively statistically significant, which is inconsistent with our earlier results.  
 
Large firms are more likely to borrow from high-quality banks, and maintain 
relationships with more banks in order to diversify credit risk hence size is a positive 
determinant of number of banking relationships. Larger firms may also suffer from 
greater agency costs and therefore profitability is negatively impacted by firm 
performance. A negative relation between leverage and the number of bank relationship 
suggests that having more leverage makes firms more prone to financial risks and 
therefore, it may be difficult for firms with high financial risks to find new bank 
relationships.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the role of bank relationship on firm performance for a sample 
of Indian manufacturing firms. Our analysis suggests that banking relationships as 
measured by the number of banking relationships a firm maintains and quantum of bank 
financing have a significant impact on firm performance. However, the direction of the 
impact on firm performance varies. While quantum of bank financing has a negative 
influence on firm performance, number of banking relationships maintained by a firm, 
positively impact the firm performance. In addition, we find that bank borrowing from 
multiple sources has a positive influence on firm performance. This implies that 
borrowing from multiple sources reduces the bank’s ability to pursue rent seeking 
activities without compromising on its ability to control and monitor firm performance.  
 
We further analyze that firm performance is a crucial factor affecting bank financing and 
the number banking relationships a firm maintains. While banking relationships are 
positively impacted by firm performance, results suggest nonlinearity between bank 
financing and firm performance. We conjecture a possibility of existence of a variant of a 
potential debt overhang concern. In other words, firms with low growth opportunities 
tend to borrow more from the banks due to lack of other opportunities to finance their 
investments. In the later part of the period, given the emergence of profitable investment 
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opportunities, these firms employed lesser debt to finance their investments in order to 
prevent the wealth transfer from shareholders to creditors.  
 
Table 3 OLS and 3SLS estimates of the relation between firm performance and bank financing.  
  OLS Model 3 SLS Model 
Performance Equation Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Bank Debt/Total Assets 
-1.412762***     
(0.192989) 
-17.03271*** 
(2.196952) 
-94.29669***              
(22.85788) 
Sales Growth 
0.2994706***     
(0.0695734) 
0.3612214*** 
(0.0875383) 
-0.0111642               
(0.2309999) 
Size 
0.0452398**       
(0.0233258) 
0.1055521 
(0.1146822) 
-1.293618***              
(0.3579521) 
Age 
0.2689023***     
(0.0473495) 
4.604339***     
(0.6333766) 
4.63528***                 
(1.225039) 
Capital Expenditure 
0.2594905*         
(0.1443474) 
1.370791***   
(0.2488856) 
3.88165***                 
(1.013707) 
Natural Logarithm of Number of 
Banks 
0.3020241***     
(0.0430213) 
1.002949*** 
(0.1158068) 
  
LN Number of Bankers*TBD/TA 
    46.68251***               
(11.28621) 
Constant 
-0.0379928         
(0.1580159) 
0.0000000272 
(0.0245781) 
3.94E-08                 
(0.0596996)                 
Bank Financing Equation       
Tobin's Q 
-0.0001572         
(0.0028596)        
0.1424609***   
(0.020325) 
1.179697***               
(0.2776433) 
Tobin's Q Square 
-0.0000297         
(0.0001878) 
-0.0086776***     
(0.0010709) 
-0.0610182***            
(0.0146034) 
Sales Growth 
0.0212346***     
(0.0055922) 
0.0103544**    
(0.0052832) 
-0.0916537**              
(0.0411726) 
Tangible Assets 
0.1655926***     
(0.0098453) 
0.1323952***    
(0.0177867) 
0.4587847***             
(0.1423865) 
Size 
0.0175655***     
(0.0015074) 
0.0422537***    
(0.0054045) 
0.0506454                   
(0.0352952) 
Age 
-0.0019139         
(0.0039607) 
0.0638522*   
(0.0349416) 
-1.236896***              
(0.3749722) 
Cash Flow 
-0.1621334***   
(0.0167725) 
-0.3898127 ***  
(0.0432611) 
-2.42107***                
(0.5499876) 
Constant 
-0.0438957***   
(0.0140425) 
7.34E-10             
(0.0014114) 
-4.00E-09                    
(0.0091694)                 
AGE is the natural log of the number of years since the firm was founded. SIZE is the natural log of the firm's total assets. Capital 
expenditure defined as Change in NET Fixed Assets scaled by Total Assets. 
Significance at 10%. 
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** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 4: 
This table shows OLS and 3SLS estimates of the relation between firm performance and the 
choice of single-or multiple-bank financing.  
Performance Equation OLS 3 SLS  
Natural Logarithm of 
Number of Banks 
0.2566604***      
(0.0428676) 
6.576357***   
(2.405595) 
Age 
0.2853642***      
(0.0476236) 
-7.092488**   
(3.416861) 
Size 
0.0400904 *         
(0.0234767) 
-2.173298***   
(0.7476469) 
Capital Expenditure 
0.0344821            
(0.1420138) 
0.0724726    
(0.0731628) 
Sales Growth 
0.3215934***      
(0.0699891) 
0.1023078  
(0.1286019) 
Constant 
-0.145762             
(0.1584184) 
-2.89E-08    
(0.0266092) 
Bank Relationship 
Equation 
    
Tobin's Q 
0.0511386 ***     
(0.0062167) 
0.1070257***    
(0.0317374) 
Age 
0.0414053**        
(0.0178289) 
1.165912***      
(0.0882482) 
Size 
0.3367897***      
(0.0067803) 
0.3269374***    
(0.0142726) 
Leverage 
0.3807173***      
(0.0410497) 
-0.0484751  
(0.0517958 ) 
Coverage 
-0.0000318           
(0.0000571) 
2.12E-06     
(0.0000232) 
Constant 
-0.9783556 ***    
(0.0601691) 
4.86E-09      
(0.0037257) 
 
AGE is the natural log of the number of years since the firm was founded. SIZE is the natural log of the firm's total assets. 
LEVERAGE is the debt-to-total-assets ratio. Capital expenditure defined as Change in NET Fixed Assets scaled by Total Assets.  
Significance at 10%. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
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